Knowledge of our own thoughts is just as interpretive as knowledge of the thoughts of others

Peter Carruthers argues at On The Human that the idea that knowledge of our own thoughts is qualitatively different than knowledge of the thoughts of others is one we need to abandon. He proposes instead that the much-discussed ‘mindreading’ faculty used to understand others is used to understand one’s own internal state, as well, in a theory he calls Interpretive Self-Access. 

Destination Memory: Stop Me if I’ve Told You This Before. Nigel Gopie. 2009; Psychological Science – Wiley InterScience

Destination Memory: Stop Me if I’ve Told You This Before. Nigel Gopie. 2009; Psychological Science – Wiley InterScience.

Everyone has recounted a story or joke to someone only to experience a nagging feeling that they may already have told this person this information. Remembering to whom one has told what, an ability that we term destination memory, has been overlooked by researchers despite its important social ramifications. Using a novel paradigm, we demonstrate that destination memory is more fallible than source memory—remembering the person from whom one has received information (Experiment 1). In Experiments 2 and 3, we increased and decreased self-focus, obtaining support for a theoretical framework that explains relatively poor destination memory performance as being the result of focusing attention on oneself and on the processes required to transmit information. Along with source memory, destination memory is an important component of episodic memory that plays a critical role in social interactions.